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Abstract
In this article I shall address the standing of intentionalist
theories of interpretation through Richard Rorty’s critique.
Rorty’s criticism arises from the position literature holds in the
postmetaphysical, liberal culture Rorty sketches As a
counterbalance to Rorty’s critique, I shall develop an
intentionalist theory of interpretation drawing on Donald
Davidson’s late philosophy of language and his view of literary
interpretation that have sadly not been taken into proper
consideration in the on-going debate in analytic aesthetics on
the role of authorial intentions in interpretation. The prospects
of Davidson’s intentionalism for meeting Rorty’s criticism are
related to the position of imagination in the Davidsonian
approach. By indicating the connections between the position
of imagination in Davidson’s views and how it has in turn been
approached in contemporary pragmatist-inspired moral
philosophy, I shall argue that an intentionalist theory is, after
all, able to meet those challenges that Rorty sees literature
and literary theory facing in his postmetaphysical culture.
Key Words
aesthetic experience, Davidson, Dewey, imagination,
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1. Introduction
Although Donald Davidson’s philosophical work did not have a
substantial effect on the critical reading of modern philosophy
that Richard Rorty presents in his Philosophy and the Mirror of
Nature (1979), Rorty’s most substantial analytic influences
came from Davidson. In particular, the key ideas of Davidson’s
late philosophy of language, as well as the view of the
relationship between mind and world in Davidson’s work,
signified for Rorty “the culmination of the holist and pragmatist
strains in contemporary analytic philosophy.”[1] Given the
influence that these aspects of Davidson’s philosophy had on
Rorty, it is strange to observe their different approaches to the
interpretation of literature and, furthermore, how seldom
those differences have been extensively considered in the
literature.[2] Davidson’s texts explicitly dealing with literary
language and interpretation support a view that ascribes a
vital position for authorial intentions, and in some significant
ways overlaps modest actual intentionalist accounts of
interpretation currently popular in analytic philosophy of art. In
Rorty’s pragmatist approach to literature, however, the
author’s intentions have virtually no place at all. Instead, Rorty
insists on a radical form of interpretive pluralism.
Noting the differences between Davidson’s and Rorty’s work on
the interpretation of literature is not interesting for exegetical
reasons alone. The disagreement apparent in them suggests a
novel framework for considering some of the basic issues in
philosophy of literature and interpretation, most importantly
the role of the author’s intentions in interpretation. The
skeptical attitude towards the position of authorial intentions
involved in literary theory that draws on poststructuralist views
of meaning has developed to such heights that the issue
regarding their role in interpretation no longer seems worth
inquiring about. In analytic aesthetics, however, that issue has
in recent years seen a revival in the form of a dispute between
two forms of intentionalism: hypothetical and modest actual
intentionalism.[3] Given Davidson’s importance for end-of-
the-century analytic philosophy, it is odd that his views on the
interpretation of literature have been left virtually unexamined
in this discussion.[4] This omission is particularly unfortunate,
for it is my belief that Davidson’s views can make a substantial
contribution to the modest intentionalist position on
interpretation. The reinforcement Davidson’s work provides for
this approach suggests a response to Rorty’s challenge to
intentionalist accounts of interpretation.
The critical tone Rorty takes towards intentionalism is related
to the position that is reserved for literature in the
postmetaphysical, liberal culture Rorty sketches, and especially
to the value that he attaches to solidarity.[5] Rorty does not
believe that the cultural importance of solidarity follows from
some kind of metaphysical ground but, rather, its centrality
should be understood in different terms. That is, “the right way
to take the slogan ‘We have obligations to human beings
simply as such’ is as a means of reminding ourselves to keep
trying to expand our sense of ‘us’ as far as we can…, to create
a more expansive sense of solidarity than we presently
have.”[6]
The important role of literature in Rorty’s postmetaphysical
analysis of culture is explained by the position that
redescriptions occupy in the enhancement of solidarity. For
Rorty, solidarity is an inherently local phenomenon, which is to
say that it must be constructed out of different elements in
different contexts rather than explained in terms of a common
human nature people share.[7] By providing their readers with
descriptions of “strange people (Alcibiades, Julien Sorel), [and]
strange families (the Karamazovs, the Casaubons),” literary
works depict encounters between human beings that the
reader may not previously have had to face. This enables him
to reflect on the problems and challenges these unfamiliar
situations pose for human beings, as well as the ways in which
the different values and interests coming into conflict can be
connected with one another.[8] These features, in turn, may
give rise to more refined descriptions for people’s conceptual
armory with which they relate to other human beings and
groups. This is the reason why Rorty finds literature an
important mode of discourse in his postmetaphysical culture.
Since for Rorty the enhancement of solidarity involves the
creation of descriptions from which it is possible to discern
salient features between human groups and to see certain
differences as irrelevant when compared to these features,
literature can ultimately help in increasing the presence of
solidarity.[9]
The fulfillment of those needs that Rorty’s postmetaphysical
culture sets for literature, however, requires a particular
approach. That Rorty finds intentionalist theories of
interpretation insufficient with regard to these challenges may
be seen from the position Rorty assigns to the person he calls
“the liberal ironist” in his postmetaphysical culture. Since this
sort of person holds an utterly skeptical attitude towards the
existence of intrinsic natures, she believes that there is no
privileged way in which objects should be approached. This
depends, instead, on the changing desires of our culture, as
well as on the specific needs a particular situation may call for.
Redescriptions of objects and events serve as the primary tool
with which the ironist pursues those transformations she finds
her culture to be in need of. In Rorty’s words, “ironists
specialize in redescribing ranges of objects or events in
partially neologistic jargon, in the hope of inciting people to
adopt and extend that jargon.”[10]
Since Rorty considers “literary criticism” a more up-to-date
name with which to capture the characteristic features of the
liberal ironist’s activity, Rorty’s views on interpretation become
intimately connected with his account of this individual.[11] In
particular, that Rorty draws this kind of connection between
the two indicates that a theory guided by intentionalist
principles is a long way from being able to provide those tools
for the ironist required by the position sketched for her by
Rorty. Rather, the liberal ironist takes her inspiration from
such interpreters as Harold Bloom, that is, from a critic who
asks “neither the author nor the text about their intentions but
simply beats the text into a shape that will serve his own
purpose. He does this by imposing a vocabulary… on the text
that may have nothing to do with any vocabulary used in the
text or by its author, and seeing what happens.”[12]
In this essay, I approach the standing of intentionalist theories
of interpretation through Rorty’s postmetaphysical critique of
this interpretive position. In the first section I raise an issue
that I think forms an interesting framework for considering the
strength of Rorty’s critique of intentionalism, namely
imagination, and the way this faculty has been approached in
recent pragmatist-inspired moral philosophy. Section two
focuses on Davidson’s view of literary interpretation. In this
section, I draw attention to the role that imagination acquires
in Davidson’s account. It is my belief that it is precisely the
emphasis Davidson’s views lay on imagination in literary
interpretation that enables it to form a highly resourceful
response to Rorty’s postmetaphysical critique of
intentionalism. This will be shown in section three.
The first parts of the article are not criticisms of Rorty’s
position on literary interpretation as such. They merely try to
undermine the critical view of intentionalism contained in his
views. However, the problems in Rorty’s postmetaphysical
critique of intentionalism indicated in the earlier parts of the
article will not leave the positive sides of Rorty’s pragmatist
theory of literary interpretation unaffected. It is my belief that
the failure of that criticism, in fact, provides a new basis for
unpacking the problematic features of Rorty’s own account of
literary interpretation. This critical examination will be carried
out in the concluding section of the article.
Reed Way Dasenbrock has perhaps devoted the most effort to
showing the relevance of Davidson’s work for literary theory.
In his opinion, one of its major implications is that it gives a
possibility for a substantial “rehabilitation of
intentionalism.”[13] I believe that the implications drawn from
Davidson’s views in this essay make a substantial contribution
to the rehabilitation that Davidson’s views afford, in
Dasenbrock’s opinion.
2. Imagination in Pragmatist Ethics
The reason why imagination is an issue that provides an
interesting outlook on Rorty’s postmetaphysical critique is that
it is a faculty tied in many ways to Rorty’s cultural sketch and
to its central liberal values, such as open-mindedness and the
importance of looking at things from different angles. Both of
these abilities involve the use of imagination at least to a
certain degree. Imagination can also be seen to hold an
important position in the liberal ironist’s activity. Presumably,
the more refined her imagination, the more productive and
original redescriptions she is able to produce. Her activities
thus become more valuable for Rorty’s postmetaphysical
ambitions as the amount of imagination involved in them
increases.
However, the most important reason why I have decided to
weigh Rorty’s postmetaphysical critique to imagination is that
a group of pragmatist philosophers have recently devoted
attention to the role of imagination in people’s moral lives, and
they regard it as occupying a vital position in proper moral
reflection. This forms an illuminating basis for assessing the
ultimate standing of Rorty’s criticism, for it is underlain by
assumptions and motivations similar to those of the
postmetaphysical view of ethics involved in Rorty’s account of
liberalism. For example, echoing Rorty’s wish to construct
moral theory on a more narrative foundation, Steven Fesmire
argues that moral philosophy should no longer take as its goal
a search for universal principles but instead should pay more
attention to the situational exigencies moral situations involve
and the way people are capable of making sense of them. For
Fesmire, this development requires “a shift in the centre of
gravity of ethics from foundational principles to
imagination….”[14]
Moral situations may and often do involve different, possibly
conflicting interests and ambiguities that cannot be resolved in
a straightforward manner by relying on a rule whose force
everybody of relevance acknowledges. Consequently, reflective
moral deliberation must be accompanied by a faculty that
manages to take hold of the complexities a particular situation
may exhibit. Fesmire believes imagination is precisely such a
capacity. Fesmire follows John Dewey in regarding imagination
as a capacity that allows one to creatively “tap” on a
situation’s possibilities.[15] This aspect of the faculty explains
the prospects it possesses for moral reflection. That is,
imagination enables one to “engage the present” in a way that
attention is expanded “beyond what is immediately
experienced so that the lessons of the past, embodied in
habits, and as-yet-unrealized potentialities ‘come home to us
and have the power to stir us.’”[16]
Fesmire’s and Rorty’s accounts of ethics do not merely share
these assumptions with each other. Fesmire’s approach is able
to make a more detailed contribution to Rorty’s goals and
ambitions. In particular, the role Fesmire ascribes to
imagination in moral reflection sheds light on the ways in
which the values in Rorty’s liberalism can be secured and
made more widespread. Imagination enlarges the resources
from which to draw material for one’s evaluation of the
situation at hand. It develops the capacity to entertain the
elements of a complex whole, as well as the capacity to see
how they might be put together. Imagination is thus connected
with those capacities the enhancement of solidarity requires.
These include the capacity to provide adequate descriptions for
the needs of a particular situation and to create novel ones
once new, perhaps unforeseeable situations emerge.
Consequently, one way in which the culture Rorty outlines may
promote the realization of its central values is to find ways of
developing and enlarging the imagination of its inhabitants.
Rorty should thus find the same capacities desirable whose
importance for moral reflection Fesmire emphasizes.
Given that Rorty’s postmetaphysical view of ethical theory
shares these underlying assumptions and goals with the
tradition of pragmatist ethics that emphasizes the role of
imagination in moral reflection, it is not surprising that in some
of his later works Rorty emphasized the cultural and social
importance of imagination more explicitly than before. For
example, he claimed that one of the significant implications of
the kind of pragmatism he advocated is that the progress that
has occurred in various fields of human life in past centuries is
a sign of peoples’ capacity to expand their imaginations rather
than of their “increased ability to represent reality
accurately.”[17]
3. Davidson, Imagination, and Interpretation
The connections between Fesmire’s and Rorty’s approaches to
ethics specified in the previous section raise the possibility of
reformulating Rorty’s postmetaphysical critique of
intentionalism in terms of the role Fesmire ascribes to
imagination in moral reflection. The question that now
becomes relevant is whether an intentionalist theory can
embrace those factors that explain the importance Fesmire
attaches to imagination, as well as the ways he believes that
faculty can be refined. If this is the case, Rorty’s
postmetaphysical critique is undermined, for it shows that
literature’s capacity to play a role in promoting the central
values of Rorty’s postmetaphysical culture need not be
supported by the kind of pragmatist account of interpretation
Rorty himself endorses. In fact, Bryan Vescio, one of the few
who have considered the relationship between Rorty’s and
Davidson’s views of literary interpretation, resolves the
disagreement apparent in them in favor of Rorty’s position
precisely because he believes it is better equipped to highlight
those aspects of literature that make them important
instruments for refining the kinds of capacities in question
here. In Vescio’s opinion, this results from Rorty’s emphasis
“that our interpretation of literature… [is] constrained only by
our purposes and ingenuity, and not by entities called
‘meanings’ or ‘intentions.’” This kind of view, thus, shows more
tolerance towards “imaginative interpretations” than theories
such as Davidson’s that ask us to constrain our interpretations
by the author’s intentions.[18] However, the problem with
Vescio’s account is that it overlooks certain crucial aspects of
Davidson’s thinking on interpretation, such as the role
imagination ultimately occupies in it. Once the full implications
of these aspects have been drawn, Davidson’s theory of
literary interpretation appears far more compelling than
Vescio’s assessment provides. At the same time this conclusion
forms an illuminating basis for a more detailed critical
examination of Rorty’s critique of intentionalism.
It might come as a surprise to someone with only a little
knowledge of Davidson’s writings that he has, in fact, claimed
literary language to serve as “a prime test of the adequacy of
any view on the nature of language.”[19] It might be an
equally surprising claim that imagination possesses an
important position in Davidson’s views of interpretation. That
this indeed is the case, however, follows directly from the
skepticism that Davidson’s late philosophy of language evinced
from the middle of the 1980s towards views which shared the
belief that rule-governed conventions of language are the
conditions of communication.[20] The particular
transformation in Davidson’s starting point explains the source
of this skepticism. Martin Gustafsson, for example, claims that
what separates “post 1984” Davidson from the earlier phases
of his career is that he began to develop his philosophy of
language on the “truly creative and unforeseeable elements” of
language use more strongly than before.[21] This change in
starting point is evident from the very first page of “A Nice
Derangement of Epitaphs,” a text that has been regarded as a
decisive turning point in Davidson’s thinking on language.
There, Davidson referred to the linguistic behavior of the radio
sitcom writer Goodman Ace to point out the ubiquity of cases
where successful communication is achieved even though the
linguistic acts performed conform in no way to the conventions
of language.[22] For Davidson, the possibility of these kinds of
cases calls for a re-evaluation of the position of conventions in
philosophical accounts of communication. That is, “the
theoretical possibility of communication without shared
practices remains philosophically important because it shows
that such sharing cannot be an essential constituent in
meaning and communication.”[23]
For Davidson, what the speaker’s “words mean is (generally)
what he intends them to.”[24] The disclaimer “generally” is
important, for despite the fact that Davidson does emphasize
the role of the speaker’s intentions, he acknowledges that the
speaker is not able to mean whatever he wishes with his
choice of words, as well as the possibility that the speaker may
ultimately fail to mean what he intended. Davidson thus
avoids his views from slipping into the so-called Humpty
Dumpty view of meaning in which meaning is in every case
seen as identical with the speaker’s intention, a view
philosophers have widely considered inadequate because, for
example, it fails to account for the essential intersubjective
character of meaning. Rather than referring to the constraints
that the conventions of language impose on linguistic acts,
Davidson overcomes the problem of Humpty Dumpty by
referring to a principle he names “the requirement of
interpretability,” which explains the failure of the speaker’s act
of communication by referring to its unreasonableness. That is,
the speaker’s act of communication fails in cases where the
speaker does not take the hearer’s linguistic capacities and
readiness to interpret into account in the approapriate
way.[25] In Davidson’s view, conventions and other inherited
practices of language use do not impose a determinate limit on
what can be meant; they just determine “the clues” the
speaker must provide for his interlocutor so that she has a
reasonable possibility of grasping the meanings he intends his
utterances to possess.[26] If the conditions expressed in the
requirement of interpretability are met, there is, in fact, “no
word or construction that cannot be converted to a new
use….”[27]
The reason why imagination acquires an important role in
Davidson’s late philosophy of language is precisely its
emphasis of the view that there are no general fixed list of
factors that explains the success of communication across
cases. There is, in other words, no “chance of regularizing or
teaching”[28] all the factors involved in the process of
communication. Instead, in many cases depending on highly
unique and passing elements, such as “knowledge of the
character, dress, role, sex”[29] and whose relevance may,
moreover, vary from context to context, one capacity that
acquires an important position in communication is “the
exercise of imagination.”[30] The importance of imagination
for Davidson’s philosophy of language comes from the specific
sense it receives. Rather than considering imagination as a
capacity of spontaneously creating novel images, it is more a
capacity of forming a diversified picture of “human interests
and attitudes” and of the constituents human situations may
involve,[31] as well as the elements of the individual situation
of the speaker and hearer at a particular time.
Given that Davidson’s texts on the problems of literary
interpretation appeared almost simultaneously with the
transformation in his thinking, his interest in the philosophical
issues related to literature can be seen as natural parts of this
turn. Those texts provide a more detailed account of the
factors that he thinks serve to make communication possible.
Since “we cannot intend what we know to be impossible,”
authors cannot ignore how their readers are prepared to
interpret their utterances, and these must be framed in a way
that there is a reasonable possibility of interpreting the
expression in the intended way.[32] Moreover, since the
reasonableness of the intended meaning and its success
involve a relationship to the reader’s prospects of
understanding, intending a specific, novel meaning for a
familiar utterance or inventing a completely new one can be a
fine-grained and delicate process. Its success requires that
the author have the ability to create a stage setting by means
of which the reader is able to recognize the intended meaning.
The reader must, in turn, grasp why the stage setting has
been provided by the author. His or her way of writing, cross-
references, and the intertexts the author is drawing on serve
as clues for a particular interpretation.
Davidson’s discussion of the prose of James Joyce is especially
illuminating. It indicates the way the success of
communication may depend on highly unique and diverse
elements, and this emphasizes the role of imagination.
Davidson:
Joyce draws on every resource his readers
command (or that he hopes they command, or
thinks they should command), every linguistic
resource, knowledge of history, geography, past
writers, and styles. He forces us both to look at
and listen to his words to find the puns and
fathom the references.[33]
Davidson, in fact, draws a connection between Joyce and
Humpty Dumpty, who famously declares in Lewis Carroll’s
Through the Looking Glass that his utterances mean whatever
he intends them to. For Davidson, Joyce and Humpty Dumpty
are connected in that they both sought to be innovators of
language. However, in Davidson’s opinion only Joyce was
successful. This is precisely because Joyce succeeded where
Humpty Dumpty failed by giving subtle, often hard to get clues
on how his utterances should be interpreted. Humpty Dumpty
was an unsuccessful innovator because he did not manage to
create the kind of stage setting that would have given his
interlocutor a reasonable opportunity of grasping the meaning
he intended his utterance to convey. In Davidson’s opinion the
case is, different with Joyce’s prose even though it seems
dense and nonsensical at first. That is, “when Joyce was flying
by the net of language, he did not intend to leave us
entangled.”[34]
Davidson’s way of developing his response to the problem of
Humpty Dumpty through a discussion of Joyce’s prose points
out a crucial difference between Davidson’s intentionalism and
some modest intentionalist views of interpretation that have
appeared in analytic aesthetics. Modest intentionalists have
attempted to salvage their position from falling into Humpty
Dumpty-ism by claiming that, while intention is indeed the
most important constituent of meaning, there nevertheless are
factors that pose constraints on what can be intended. These
factors include such things as the conventions of language and
literature[35] and other kinds of “natural and logical
limits.”[36]
While Davidson does acknowledge the problem of Humpty
Dumpty, he would arguably find these responses unsuccessful.
The reason for this is the very same that explains the critical
tone Davidson’s late philosophy of language takes towards
conventionalist accounts of meaning. The replies offered by
modest intentionalists to the problem of Humpty Dumpty are
plagued by troubles similar to those that make conventionalist
accounts of meaning problematic in Davidson’s eyes. That is,
the responses found in analytic aesthetics too overlook the
multifarious and unique character of those elements on which
successful interaction between the author and reader may rest
in many cases. This is precisely what Davidson’s example of
Joyce is intended to indicate. At the same time, that example
further stresses the importance of imagination for Davidson’s
account of communication. In Davidson’s view, the
interpretation of Joyce not only requires a capacity to identify
the resources Joyce is drawing on in his works, namely,
history, geography, past writers, and styles, but also an ability
to grasp the effect they are intended to have on the context
where Joyce inserts them. This process requires drawing
connections between different elements and understanding
how they fuse together, a process that is similar to that
involved in the use of imagination. However, since the clues
that serve as a fuel for imagination are hard to dig up, “as
much is demanded from the reader as of the author….”
Davidson concludes, “By fragmenting familiar languages and
recycling the raw material Joyce provokes the reader into
involuntary collaboration….The center of creative energy is
thus moved from the artist to a point between the writer and
his audience.”[37]
4. The Imaginative and Aesthetic Experience
The specific role that Davidson’s views attribute to imagination
in interpretation implies that Vescio’s assessment of the
prospects of Davidson’s intentionalism introduced earlier is
overhasty. A more detailed investigation of the ways in which
that account may be connected with the pragmatist view of
ethics emphasizing the role of imagination in moral reflection
is required for a final assessment of Rorty’s postmetaphysical
critique. The prospects of Davidsonian intentionalism for that
challenge may be begun by observing a distinction between
the two senses of imagination Fesmire draws from the work of
John Dewey, as well as the way he appropriates Dewey’s
aesthetic writings.
As is well known, the central aim of Dewey’s writings on
aesthetics is to provide a detailed characterization of aesthetic
experience and to uncover the social and political factors
connected to this form of experience. For Dewey, aesthetic
experience is characterized by a structured unity proceeding
from “suspense” to “fulfillment” marked by such qualities as
intensity, complexity, and absorption between the subject and
object of experience.[38] Pragmatist ethics does not see an
experience of this form as alien to the field of ethics, but
rather maintains that “moral conduct is helpfully conceived on
the model of aesthetic perception.”[39] This assumption, in
fact, recalls the view of the relationship between aesthetics
and ethics involved in Rorty’s approach to literature that, in
his opinion, calls the distinction between “the moral and the
‘merely’ aesthetic” into question.[40]
Dewey makes a distinction between two forms of imagination.
These are the imaginative and the imaginary. What
distinguishes these two forms from each other is that they
involve different constraints. While in the imaginary sense,
imagination is allowed to play as freely as possible with the
material serving as its basis, imaginative uses of imagination
always spring from a foundation involving various kinds of
constraints, that create boundaries for the course it can
ultimately take. In this respect, in the imaginative case there
is a more determinate connection between where imagination
starts and what it ends up producing than is the case with the
imaginary.[41]
This particular difference between the two senses of
imagination brings out the reasons why Fesmire stresses only
the importance of the form of imagination Dewey denotes with
the term “imaginative.” This is precisely because it involves
the kinds of constraints the imaginary sense lacks, moral
reflection guided by the imaginative sense thus being more
rigorous by nature than a discourse where the imaginary sense
would occupy an essential position. If anything, the imaginary
sense becomes an unwanted component in moral reflection,
for by being allowed to fly as freely as possible, moral
deliberation guided by the imaginary sense of imagination is,
in Fesmire’s opinion, in danger of transforming this mode of
discourse into mere “moral fantasy,” thus possibly removing
reflection from everyday, social concerns to a level where a
firm enough connection to them is no longer sustained. The
imaginative, on the other hand, is “imbued with sociocultural
meanings and rooted in the problematic conditions.”[42]
Fesmire’s approach to Dewey’s writings draws attention to the
position of imagination in Dewey’s account of aesthetic
experience. What is important to note is that it is precisely the
imaginative sense of imagination Dewey thinks underpins
aesthetic experience, Dewey, in fact, explicitly stating that
“esthetic experience is imaginative.”[43] The claim that in
Dewey’s conception of aesthetic experience the imaginative
has an important role does not merely rest on this quotation.
Observing the characteristic features Dewey believes this form
of experience possesses also serves to show why imagination
holds this kind of position in Dewey’s account, that is, a kind of
structured intensity that extends for a certain period of time
and is demarcated from the stream of experiences surrounding
it. It seems that for an experience to acquire these qualities
requires an active contribution from the subject of experience
who holds the different parts of the experience together and
molds them into a structured unity. Given that Dewey at one
point describes imagination to consist in the making of “old
and familiar things… new in experience,”[44] it is arguable
that, for Dewey, imagination is precisely this capacity.
Moreover, it seems that there must be specific limits to how
this underlying activity may function in aesthetic experience,
for without some sort of boundaries, the experience could not
acquire the character that, in Dewey’s opinion, is typical of
aesthetic experience. That is, were the use of imagination not
to involve “elements of resistance,” as Dewey himself puts it,
aesthetic experience could not possess the kind of distinctive,
developmental structure that Dewey regards it as
possessing.[45]
Elaborating on this investigation of the two forms of
imagination found in Dewey’s work and the way they are
connected to aesthetic experience shows problems in Rorty’s
postmetaphysical critique of intentionalism. This is because the
investigation brings out factors showing that intentionalist
theories of interpretation are able to embrace those features
of literary works that explain their value for the social and
political issues central to Rorty’s liberalism. I argued earlier
that one way in which those issues may be endorsed is to find
ways of refining peoples’ imagination as well as to extend its
presence in peoples’ lives. As Fesmire explains, “the more
refined one’s imagination (a function of relevant habits), the
richer the fund of germane possibilities and the more reliable
one’s valuations.”[46] Given the connection Dewey draws
between the imaginative sense of imagination and aesthetic
experience, engaging with one’s environment and artworks in
a way that Dewey would regard as aesthetic becomes an
important source of developing those capacities for proper
moral reflection, in Fesmire’s opinion. This is because the
realization of aesthetic experience requires an active
contribution from the imagination of the subject of experience.
Since the activity involved in the use of imagination for tying
different elements into new unities is an important element in
molding the structure of aesthetic experience into the kind of
structured, unified complexity Dewey thinks it possesses,
environments that afford aesthetic experiences, as well as
engagements with artworks that are marked by the
characteristic features of Dewey’s concept of aesthetic
experience, are important means of triggering, sustaining, and
ultimately refining our imaginative capacities.
At this point, it is important to observe that there are
distinctive similarities between Dewey’s description of the
imaginative sense of imagination and the role imagination
occupies in the Davidsonian intentionalism outlined above. In
both cases, the core of imagination is understood in a similar
way, that is, as a capacity to collect and compose individual
things into a complex whole, and to build different
relationships between the individual parts that make up the
whole. In the Davidsonian intentionalism outlined above,
imagination is, in other words, intended to aid interpretation in
tying different elements into complex unities in a sense similar
to the way imagination in its imaginative sense is meant to
enlarge one’s perception in the case of moral reflection. Given
this structural overlap between these domains, Davidsonian
intentionalism proves to be a fruitful approach to those factors
that make engagements with literary works important ways of
developing imagination precisely in the imaginative sense. One
can easily find Dewey a description of an experience that
corresponds to the structure that Davidson sees the
interpretation of Joyce’s works to involve, as well as the
experience that this sort of engagement gives rise to. For
instance, Dewey maintains that “the spontaneity of art is not
one of opposition to anything but marks the complete
absorption in an orderly development. This absorption is
characteristic of aesthetic experience but it is an ideal for all
experience….”[47] Dewey considers that the experience he
describes in this quotation possesses an orderly developing
character. The form of imagination holding the elements of the
experience together that makes the absorption possible is
imaginative in character. In this respect, Davidson’s example
of Joyce indicates that to follow intentionalist principles in
interpretation does not inevitably minimize the role of the
interpreter’s imagination in interpretation. It also suggests that
if it is indeed possible to cultivate one’s imaginative capacities
by engaging with one’s environment and with artworks in a
way regarded as aesthetic by Dewey, as Fesmire assumes,
then intentionalist theories are even better equipped to
embrace those features in our interactions with artworks. This
makes these encounters an important source in cultivating our
capacity for moral reflection more than the approach Rorty
favors. This is because by eliminating all definitive boundaries
from interpretation, the form of imagination involved in this
activity runs the risk of becoming no different from the sense
of imagination Dewey denotes with the term “imaginary,” that
is, the very form of imagination Fesmire refuses to grant any
role in moral reflection.
Furthermore, Davidson’s example of Joyce suggests that, in
many cases, an approach to the artwork guided by an
understanding of what the author meant serves as a
precondition for the experience of the work to acquire the
unity and orderly developing character Dewey thinks aesthetic
experience possesses. Only in that kind of case does “the
material experienced runs its course to fulfillment,” and only
then “is it [aesthetic experience] integrated within and
demarcated in the general stream of experience from other
experiences.”[48] Without the elements of resistance following
from the author’s intentions, which determine the arena for
imagination’s functioning, the experience resulting from the
engagement could lack unity and order and would thus not be
an aesthetic one as Dewey defines it. To be sure, Dewey
would likely be willing to hold a more flexible view of
interpretation from the one I support here. Nevertheless,
Dewey’s work on imagination and aesthetic experience
provides ample resources for a defense of intentionalism. It
shows that in many cases a lack of understanding the author’s
intentions may even hinder our imaginative engagement with
an artwork and consequently the possible valuable outcomes
of that engagement in the development of imagination.
This investigation of the connections between Davidsonian
intentionalism and the role of imagination in pragmatist
approaches to ethics illuminates the problems involved in
Rorty’s postmetaphysical critique of intentionalism. The
fundamental point of Rorty’s critique is that intentionalist
theories of interpretation should be discarded because they are
incapable of accounting for those features of literary works
that make them important for the social goals and values
central to the postmetaphysical, liberal society Rorty outlines.
A central element of my argument against Rorty’s critique is
that realizating those values Rorty’s culture is founded on
requires refining the same human capacities whose role in
proper moral reflection Fesmire highlights. Now, if
engagements with artworks are important means of
developing the capacities that both Rorty and Fesmire value,
and if the Davidsonian intentionalism formulated in this essay
is able to give imagination a role in interpretation which
ultimately proves profitable for its refinement, then
intentionalist theories are not as impoverished as Rorty’s
postmetaphysical critique assumes. The theory of literary
interpretation drawn on Davidson’s views shows that an
intentionalist approach to interpretation can embrace those
factors of literary works that make them important for Rorty’s
liberal culture. Rorty’s liberal ironist thus need not be a
Bloomian interpreter who forsakes the author’s intentions for
her creative interpretive efforts, and who sees the author’s
intentions only as obstacles for the full realization of the
aesthetic potentials of the work under interpretation. There is
no essential connection between holding a view of
interpretation expressed in Rorty’s writings on the liberal
ironist and satisfying those demands Rorty sets for literature.
The intentionalist view of interpretation developed on
Davidson’s views in this essay is able to meet them as well.
For this reason, Rorty’s postmetaphysical critique of
intentionalism fails.
5. Conclusions
That intentionalist theories of interpretation are capable of
accounting for those factors in our engagements with literary
works valued by Rorty does not by itself undermine Rorty’s
own pragmatist theory of literary interpretation. It merely
shows that Rorty’s postmetaphysical critique is based on a
mistaken view of intentionalism. This conclusion, however,
does not yet manage to resolve the more fundamental issue of
which of the two, i.e., Rorty’s pragmatism or Davidson’s
intentionalism, should be favored.
In order to dig into this problem in more detail it is worth
observing that the social considerations central to Rorty’s
postmetaphysical culture are not the only factors by which he
seeks to undermine intentionalist views of interpretation. The
general anti-essentialist leanings of Rorty’s pragmatist theory
of literature may also call into question some fundamental
assumptions underpinning different forms of intentionalism,
most importantly the view of meaning they involve. Since
interpretation always takes place against the backdrop of a
certain cultural and historical setting, as Rorty emphasizes, the
meaning of literary works cannot possess the kind of
determinacy assumed in intentionalism, for that meaning
cannot be determined in isolation from the different historical
practices of interpreting, that are by nature contingent, and,
hence, ever-changing.[49]
However, the difficulty with the criticism of intentionalism
based on Rorty’s anti-essentialist view of interpretation is that
it implies a problem for Rorty’s own position perhaps even
more severe than the one that the anti-essentialism was
supposed to reveal in intentionalism. Given the general anti-
essentialist character of Rorty’s pragmatist view of literary
interpretation that lies behind the liberal ironist, one way of
arguing against Rorty’s position would be to show that his
account involves problems similar to those his general
pragmatist philosophy faces. These are that it ultimately falls
into some form of relativism, and that his view of literary
interpretation is thus plagued by the same contradictions and
incoherencies that relativistic views involve in general. This line
of argument is central, for example, to the criticism Reed Way
Dasenbrock makes of Rorty’s pragmatist theory of
literature.[50] Relativism in literary interpretation has also
been rejected on the grounds that it is in danger of depriving
the interpretive sciences, such as literary studies, from any
kind of intellectual credibility. E.D. Hirsch, for example, holds
that the possibility of introducing “a genuinely discriminating
norm” against which the comparative validity of different,
possibly conflicting interpretations may be assessed serves as
the precondition of the very meaningfulness of literary
interpretation, and only the author’s intention is able to
provide the normative force this purpose requires.[51]
A response to Rorty’s account of literary interpretation relying
on these kinds of factors would, however, underestimate the
ultimate challenge that his views set for literary theory and
intentionalist accounts of interpretation. A large part of the
commentary on Rorty’s work has focused on the question of
the possible relativistic consequences of Rorty’s views and
what they imply for the general credibility of his philosophy.
The recurrence of the charge of relativism did not, however,
weaken Rorty’s trust in the ability of his theory to overcome
that problem.[52] A central feature of Rorty’s response is to
reconsider the terms with which philosophical conceptions are
assessed. That is, rather than seeing this as a metaphysical
question on how our philosophical views correspond to an
independent reality, the question of their strength should
instead concern the “convenience” of those views.[53] For
Rorty, this transformation precisely means that philosophical
debates are modulated from “a methodological key” into an
“ethico-political key,“ which is to say that “now one is
debating what purposes are worth bothering to fulfill….”[54]
Leaving aside the question of what the transformation Rorty
insists on means in the context of metaphysics and
epistemology, these aspects of Rorty’s work show that, in the
case of the philosophy of literary interpretation, the critical
edge of his views are ultimately metaphilosophical by nature.
That is, Rorty’s pragmatist view of interpretation calls for a re-
evaluation of the factors with which the success of theories of
interpretation is to be assessed. It may indeed be the case
that Rorty fails to satisfy the requirement Hirsch introduces,
but this does not mean that the strength of literary theories
could not be assessed on other grounds, such as how
convenient they are in regard to some relevant cultural
considerations in which literature occupies an important
position. If the kind of transformation Rorty is calling for in this
response is accepted, the criticism of Rorty’s position on
literary interpretation which appeals to its likely relativistic
consequences loses its force, for in this case the argument is in
danger of just begging the question against Rorty. At one point
Rorty notes that, instead of ‘relativists,’ a more accurate name
for philosophers such as himself would be ‘anti-Platonists.’
That is, “we anti-Platonists cannot permit ourselves to be
called ‘relativists,’ since that description begs the central
question. That central question is about the utility of the
vocabulary that we inherited from Plato and Aristotle.”[55]
Now, one of the important upshots of the failure of Rorty’s
postmetaphysical critique of intentionalism is that this
metaphilosophical way of arguing for his pragmatist position
on literary interpretation does not work. The social implications
involved in the Davidsonian intentionalism developed in this
essay show that a very different view of literary interpretation
is also able to meet those challenges that Rorty sees literature
and literary theory facing in his postmetaphysical culture
rather than his own. This implies that the factors Rorty raises
in his metaphilosophical argument, such as the ability of the
pragmatist view to provide resourceful tools for the liberal
ironist, no longer offer exclusive support for Rorty’s own
position on literary interpretation. That is to say, Rorty’s
metaphilosophical argument fails because the satisfaction of
the requirements of the position Rorty sets for literature does
not require the kind of transformation Rorty’s
metaphilosophical argument insists.
This conclusion implies two problems for Rorty’s pragmatist
account of literary interpretation. First, any problems that
Rorty’s views may face, but that Davidsonian intentionalism is
able to overcome, provide strong reasons for supporting an
intentionalist approach to interpretation over Rorty’s
pragmatist theory. The general credibility of Rorty’s position
crumbles as the list of these problems increases.[56] Second,
the unpersuasiveness of Rorty’s metaphilosophical argument is
troubling also for the reason that there is still a group of
philosophers who are not convinced by Rorty’s way of
defending his philosophical views by relying on the
metaphilosophical factors he raises.[57] The ultimate problem
that Rorty faces, once the prospects of Davidsonian
intentionalism are accepted, is that at least in the context of
the philosophy of literature the question regarding the strength
of Rorty’s metaphilosophical argument is in danger of
becoming irrelevant. This is because an intentionalist view of
interpretation, that arguably does not involve the kinds of
problems Rorty tries to overcome with the metaphilosophical
factors he introduces, can accommodate those factors that are
supposed to provide fuel for the metaphilosophical argument.
So the problem Rorty’s view of literary interpretation
ultimately faces is not only that the metaphilosophical
argument intended to support it might not be as convincing as
Rorty presumes, but that the whole question whether it is
convincing or not is irrelevant. These conclusions reveal the
ultimate failure of Rorty’s postmetaphysical critique of
intentionalism.
In his essay “Solidarity or Objectivity?” Rorty writes:
If we could ever be moved solely by the desire for
solidarity, setting aside the desire for objectivity
altogether, then we should think of human
progress as making it possible for human beings
to do more interesting things and be more
interesting people, not as heading towards a
place which has somehow been prepared for
humanity in advance.[58]
The fact that intentionalist theories of interpretation are
capable of accounting for those values and goals Rorty’s
postmetaphysical culture is founded on implies that, at least in
context of literary interpretation, there is no incongruence
between the goal Rorty wants us to pursue and the goal he
wants us to give up. We can, in other words, keep our desire
for objectivity in interpretation as this attitude is expressed in
intentionalism without this in any way compromising our goal
to enhance the feeling of solidarity between human
beings.[59]
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